When do elections help autocrats? The plight of Palestinians under SNTV in Jordan

Abstract

Autocrats are often accused of manipulating electoral rules to favour pro-regime groups at the expense of the opposition. They select electoral systems, gerrymander districts, and engage in electoral fraud to ensure that elections do not challenge their rule. We investigate the extent to which incumbent rulers engage in such tactics by focusing on the case of Jordan. In particular we examine whether the Jordanian regime has ‘tweaked’ the single non transferable vote system (SNTV) so that it systematically favours ethnic Jordanian tribes of nomadic descent, who form the bedrock of support for the monarchy and against ethnic Palestinian tribes, who are more supportive of opposition parties. SNTV is also notorious for causing coordination problems for parties – or tribes in this case – that offer candidates. Using data from municipal elections, we find that the regime does indeed advantage nomadic residents. Municipalities with a significant presence of these residents were assigned a greater number of council seats per unit of population and lower district magnitudes, facilitating electoral coordination. Nomadic tribes also performed better with regard to voter coordination but not in nominating the optimal number of candidates. Our findings demonstrate that clean elections in authoritarian countries if done “right” can perpetuate and bolster regime favourites while simultaneously disenfranchising their challengers.