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dc.contributor.authorCarline, NF
dc.contributor.authorGao, Y
dc.contributor.authorKuo, J-M
dc.date.accessioned2023-12-13T13:30:23Z
dc.date.issued2023-12-11
dc.date.updated2023-12-13T13:05:02Z
dc.description.abstractRecent studies suggest that greater exposure to the market for corporate control matters for managers and shareholders since it affects firms’ ex-post risk of experiencing a stock price crash. The findings though question the direction of the effect. In contrast, in this study, we are the first to examine the effects of firms’ ex-ante risk of experiencing a stock price crash, a likely antecedent of which is managers’ concealment of news on aspects of the market for corporate control. We find that higher crash risk leads to greater takeover target likelihood. This relationship, which is robust to duly circumventing reverse causality, depends to a significant extent on inferior managerial quality and greater managerial discretion around financial accruals, affording richer insight into the notion that correction of managerial behaviour is a stimulus for the market for corporate control, but one that depends on the likely extent of managers’ concealment of news. We also concurrently find that actual takeover targets with higher crash risk generate a lower bid premium and receive more payment with stock. Overall, our findings strongly suggest that decision-making in the market for corporate control is at least partially explained by incentives linked to opportunistic prices and takeovers of lemons.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 11 December 2023en_GB
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8551.12782
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/134787
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.rights© 2023 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy of Management. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.en_GB
dc.titleStock price crash risk and the market for corporate controlen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2023-12-13T13:30:23Z
dc.identifier.issn1045-3172
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available from Wiley via the DOI in this record. en_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1467-8551
dc.identifier.journalBritish Journal of Managementen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofBritish Journal of Management
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2023-11-07
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2023-12-11
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2023-12-13T13:28:19Z
refterms.versionFCDVoR
refterms.dateFOA2023-12-13T13:30:30Z
refterms.panelCen_GB
refterms.dateFirstOnline2023-12-11


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© 2023 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy
of Management.
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2023 The Authors. British Journal of Management published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of British Academy of Management. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.