Performance management and political accountability: how local governments respond to performance feedback
Hong, S; Ji, S; Kim, TK
Date: 20 March 2024
Article
Journal
Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration
Publisher
Routledge
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Using the results of an annual assessment of local governments’
integrity levels from 2012 to 2016, we explore how Korea’s local
governments respond to performance feedback provided by the
central government. First, we find clear performance improvement
only among localities performing below the average of their social
comparison ...
Using the results of an annual assessment of local governments’
integrity levels from 2012 to 2016, we explore how Korea’s local
governments respond to performance feedback provided by the
central government. First, we find clear performance improvement
only among localities performing below the average of their social
comparison groups. This result supports the negativity bias hypothesis, which posits that policymakers are driven more by negative
than by positive information. Second, local governments’ responses
to feedback increased as election dates approached. This outcome
suggests that electoral incentives magnify the effectiveness of
performance management. Third, negative performance information released immediately before elections is associated with the
incumbents’ electoral defeat, which is consistent with the hypothesis that performance information helps citizens hold policymakers
accountable during elections. Overall, the findings imply that performance management (managerial accountability) and elections
(political accountability) are mutually reinforcing mechanisms and
that voter myopia can partially erode this synergy.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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