Chief executive officer marital status and corporate credit ratings
dc.contributor.author | Cai, X | |
dc.contributor.author | Gao, Y | |
dc.contributor.author | Wu, Z | |
dc.contributor.author | Yuan, J | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-06-10T09:41:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-05-29 | |
dc.date.updated | 2024-06-08T09:32:09Z | |
dc.description.abstract | In this study, we investigate the effects of CEO marital status on credit risk assessments. We find that firms with married CEOs receive more favorable credit ratings. We also find that firms with married CEOs have a lower bankruptcy risk, less exposure to business uncertainty shocks, and better institutional corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, giving richer insights into potential mechanisms through which married CEOs improve credit ratings. Furthermore, we find that the positive effects of married CEOs on credit ratings are more pronounced for firms with stronger CEO risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation and firms with greater tournament incentives measured as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior executives. Overall, this study emphasizes the implications of CEO marital status for debtholder wealth. | en_GB |
dc.format.extent | 103385- | |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 95 (A), article 103385 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103385 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/136202 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/). | en_GB |
dc.subject | CEO marital status | en_GB |
dc.subject | Corporate credit ratings | en_GB |
dc.subject | Bankruptcy risk | en_GB |
dc.subject | Corporate social responsibility (CSR) | en_GB |
dc.subject | Business uncertainty shocks | en_GB |
dc.title | Chief executive officer marital status and corporate credit ratings | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2024-06-10T09:41:21Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1057-5219 | |
exeter.article-number | 103385 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.description | Data availability: The authors do not have permission to share data. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | International Review of Financial Analysis | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartof | International Review of Financial Analysis | |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2024-02-19 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2024-05-29 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2024-06-10T09:37:16Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2024-06-10T09:41:26Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).