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dc.contributor.authorCai, X
dc.contributor.authorGao, Y
dc.contributor.authorWu, Z
dc.contributor.authorYuan, J
dc.date.accessioned2024-06-10T09:41:21Z
dc.date.issued2024-05-29
dc.date.updated2024-06-08T09:32:09Z
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we investigate the effects of CEO marital status on credit risk assessments. We find that firms with married CEOs receive more favorable credit ratings. We also find that firms with married CEOs have a lower bankruptcy risk, less exposure to business uncertainty shocks, and better institutional corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance, giving richer insights into potential mechanisms through which married CEOs improve credit ratings. Furthermore, we find that the positive effects of married CEOs on credit ratings are more pronounced for firms with stronger CEO risk-taking incentives provided by option compensation and firms with greater tournament incentives measured as the pay gap between the CEO and the next layer of senior executives. Overall, this study emphasizes the implications of CEO marital status for debtholder wealth.en_GB
dc.format.extent103385-
dc.identifier.citationVol. 95 (A), article 103385en_GB
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2024.103385
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/136202
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.rights© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).en_GB
dc.subjectCEO marital statusen_GB
dc.subjectCorporate credit ratingsen_GB
dc.subjectBankruptcy risken_GB
dc.subjectCorporate social responsibility (CSR)en_GB
dc.subjectBusiness uncertainty shocksen_GB
dc.titleChief executive officer marital status and corporate credit ratingsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2024-06-10T09:41:21Z
dc.identifier.issn1057-5219
exeter.article-number103385
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.descriptionData availability: The authors do not have permission to share data.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalInternational Review of Financial Analysisen_GB
dc.relation.ispartofInternational Review of Financial Analysis
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2024-02-19
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2024-05-29
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2024-06-10T09:37:16Z
refterms.versionFCDVoR
refterms.dateFOA2024-06-10T09:41:26Z
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2024 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).