(De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency
dc.contributor.author | Martino, P | |
dc.contributor.author | Vanacker, T | |
dc.contributor.author | Filatotchev, I | |
dc.contributor.author | Bellavitis, C | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2024-09-02T09:42:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2024-08-31 | |
dc.date.updated | 2024-08-31T15:42:27Z | |
dc.description.abstract | Drawing on institutional and demand-side perspectives, we investigate performance implications of (de)centralized governance modes in platform-based new ventures, and the conditions under which (de)centralization generates more value. Using a sample of 1,431 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs), a new source of entrepreneurial finance, we find that centralization of decision-making is positively associated with platforms’ market value. Further, we consider how platform characteristics affect this relationship, finding that both the presence of an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and project transparency negatively moderate the positive relationship between centralization and market value. Thus, decentralized platforms need leaders with technical experience and project transparency to generate more value. Overall, this study provides a better understanding of the boundary conditions that increase the value of (de)centralized governance. Plain English Summary - This study investigates how different governance structures impact the market value of new blockchain-based ventures that conduct Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). We explore the roles of centralized and decentralized decision-making and how these structures affect platform performance. Our findings show that centralized governance, where decision-making is concentrated, tends to increase a platform’s market value. However, having an experienced Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and clear project transparency can reduce the reliance on centralization. This implies that decentralized platforms can also achieve high market value if they have transparent processes and skilled leaders who can manage the technical aspects. The primary implication for practice is that new blockchain platforms should focus on hiring experienced technical leaders and ensuring transparency in their projects to attract investors and customers. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Università di Pisa | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 31 August 2024. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | https://doi.org/10.1007/s11187-024-00964-6 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/137300 | |
dc.identifier | ORCID: 0000-0001-5608-1944 (Vanacker, Tom) | |
dc.identifier | ScopusID: 13205591800 (Vanacker, Tom) | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Springer | en_GB |
dc.rights | © The Author(s) 2024. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/. | en_GB |
dc.subject | Entrepreneurial finance | en_GB |
dc.subject | Platform governance | en_GB |
dc.subject | Decentralization | en_GB |
dc.subject | Platform performance | en_GB |
dc.subject | Initial Coin Offerings | en_GB |
dc.subject | Demand-side theory | en_GB |
dc.title | (De)centralized governance and the value of platform-based new ventures: The moderating role of teams and transparency | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2024-09-02T09:42:10Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0921-898X | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available from Springer via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1573-0913 | |
dc.identifier.journal | Small Business Economics | en_GB |
dc.relation.ispartof | Small Business Economics | |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2024-08-10 | |
dcterms.dateSubmitted | 2023-11-30 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2024-08-31 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2024-08-31T15:42:29Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2024-09-02T09:42:26Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
refterms.dateFirstOnline | 2024-08-31 | |
exeter.rights-retention-statement | Yes |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © The Author(s) 2024. Open Access. This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.