dc.contributor.author | Bolleyer, Nicole | |
dc.contributor.author | Swenden, W | |
dc.contributor.author | McEwen, N | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-01-19T11:46:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014-05-05 | |
dc.description.abstract | The case studies revealed that the constitutional nature of a multi-level system indeed shapes its modes of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination and, with it, the way competences are (re)allocated in the longer term. Both in federal arrangements and in confederations, the ‘subunits’ – whose status is constitutionally protected – could more easily defend their decision-making capacity within their areas of jurisdiction because they can veto changes in the allocation of competences, an advantage lower-level governments in regionalized systems do not enjoy. Similarly, in federal and confederal systems day-to-day interaction in Inter Governmental Relations (IGR) predominantly took place in multilateral structures, while in regionalized systems bilateralism was more pronounced. The relative influence of party-political (in)congruence on IGR, in contrast, was more varied than theoretically expected. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 12, Issue 4/5, pp. 510 - 534 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1057/cep.2014.12 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/16183 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Palgrave | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v12/n4/full/cep201412a.html | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher mandated | en_GB |
dc.subject | Multi-level systems | en_GB |
dc.subject | comparative federalism | en_GB |
dc.subject | institutionalism | en_GB |
dc.subject | intergovernmental relations | en_GB |
dc.title | "Constitutional Dynamics and Partisan Conflict: A Comparative Assessment of Multi-level Systems in Europe" | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.description | publication-status: Published | en_GB |
dc.description | types: Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Comparative European Politics | en_GB |