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dc.contributor.authorBolleyer, Nicole
dc.contributor.authorSwenden, W
dc.contributor.authorMcEwen, N
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-19T11:46:33Z
dc.date.issued2014-05-05
dc.description.abstractThe case studies revealed that the constitutional nature of a multi-level system indeed shapes its modes of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination and, with it, the way competences are (re)allocated in the longer term. Both in federal arrangements and in confederations, the ‘subunits’ – whose status is constitutionally protected – could more easily defend their decision-making capacity within their areas of jurisdiction because they can veto changes in the allocation of competences, an advantage lower-level governments in regionalized systems do not enjoy. Similarly, in federal and confederal systems day-to-day interaction in Inter Governmental Relations (IGR) predominantly took place in multilateral structures, while in regionalized systems bilateralism was more pronounced. The relative influence of party-political (in)congruence on IGR, in contrast, was more varied than theoretically expected.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 12, Issue 4/5, pp. 510 - 534en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1057/cep.2014.12
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/16183
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherPalgraveen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.palgrave-journals.com/cep/journal/v12/n4/full/cep201412a.htmlen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonPublisher mandateden_GB
dc.subjectMulti-level systemsen_GB
dc.subjectcomparative federalismen_GB
dc.subjectinstitutionalismen_GB
dc.subjectintergovernmental relationsen_GB
dc.title"Constitutional Dynamics and Partisan Conflict: A Comparative Assessment of Multi-level Systems in Europe"en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.descriptionpublication-status: Publisheden_GB
dc.descriptiontypes: Articleen_GB
dc.identifier.journalComparative European Politicsen_GB


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