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dc.contributor.authorHou, Wenxuan
dc.contributor.authorLee, Edward
dc.contributor.authorStathopoulos, Konstantinos
dc.contributor.authorTong, Zhenxu
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-11T14:40:04Z
dc.date.issued2013-07
dc.description.abstractThe split share structure reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more strongly related to share price movements. We predict that this reform will create remuneration arrangements that strengthen the relationship between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing that there is such an effect among state-controlled firms, and especially those where the dominant shareholders have a greater incentive to improve share return performance. Our results indicate that this reform strengthens the accountability of executives to external monitoring by the stock market, and therefore benefits minority shareholders in China.en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/17189
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherTaylor & Francisen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.tandfonline.com/toc/rejf20/current#.VVC-ZZ1wbcsen_GB
dc.subjectexecutive compensationen_GB
dc.subjectsplit share structure reformen_GB
dc.subjectstate ownershipen_GB
dc.subjectChinaen_GB
dc.titleExecutive compensation and the split share structure reform in Chinaen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2015-05-11T14:40:04Z
dc.identifier.issn1351-847X
dc.identifier.issn10.1080/1351847X.2013.802250
dc.descriptionAccepteden_GB
dc.descriptionArticleen_GB
dc.description"This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European Journal of Finance on 08 Jul 2013, available online: http://wwww.tandfonline.com/10.1080/1351847X.2013.802250."en_GB
dc.identifier.journal1466-4364en_GB


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