Three Aristotelian Accounts of Disease and Disability
Glackin, Shane N.
Journal of Applied Philosophy
Wiley for Society for Applied Philosophy
Reason for embargo
The question of whether medical and psychiatric judgements involve a normative or evaluative component has been a source of wide and vehement disagreement. But among those who think such a component is involved, there is considerable further disagreement as to its nature. In this paper, I consider several versions of Aristotelian normativism, as propounded by Christopher Megone, Michael Thompson and Philippa Foot, and Martha Nussbaum. The first two, I claim, can be persuasively rebutted by different modes of liberal pluralist challenge – respectively, pluralism about structures of social organisation and pluralism about biological forms. Nussbaum’s version, by contrast, is alert to the need for pluralism; I argue, however, that the Aristotelian aspects of her theory hamper her pursuit of those pluralistic aims.
Copyright © 2015 Wiley. This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Glackin, S. N. (2015), Three Aristotelian Accounts of Disease and Disability. Journal of Applied Philosophy, which has been published in final form at 10.1111/japp.12114. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving: http://olabout.wiley.com/WileyCDA/Section/id-820227.html#terms