The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability

Abstract

This paper proposes a reputation-based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioural predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely principal-agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivalled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability-enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A ‘reputation-informed’ theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing ‘drift’, or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability – in terms of both holding and giving – is about managing and cultivating one’s reputation vis-à-vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one’s audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one’s (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.