Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia
Taylor Aiken, A
This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Palgrave Macmillan via the DOI in this record.
Reason for embargo
Social cognition and interpersonal relatedness are currently much-discussed topics in philosophy and cognitive science. Many of the debates focus on the causal mechanisms purportedly responsible for our ability to relate to and understand one another. When emotions and affectivity enter into these debates, they are generally portrayed as targets of social cognitive processes (i.e., as perceived in another person’s facial expressions, gestures, utterances, behavioural patterns, etc.) that must be interpreted or ‘decoded’ by the mechanisms in question. However, the role that emotions and affectivity play in facilitating interpersonal relatedness has not received the same level of attention. Nor has much thought been given to the spatiality of our interpersonal relations—that is, the common space in which we come together and engage with one another as social agents.
Losing Social Space: Phenomenological Disruptions of Spatiality and Embodiment in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia, in Reynolds J, Sebold R (eds) Phenomenology and Science, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, p.121-139