dc.contributor.author | Toon, A | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-07-06T14:12:16Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-10-10 | |
dc.description.abstract | Mental fictionalism is the view that, even if mental states do not exist, it is useful to talk
as if they do. Mental states are useful fictions. Recent philosophy of mind has seen a
growing interest in mental fictionalism. To date, much of the discussion has concerned the
general features of the approach. In this paper, I develop a specific form of mental
fictionalism by drawing on Kendall Walton’s work on make-believe. According to the
approach I propose, talk of mental states is a useful pretence for describing people and
their behaviour. I try to clarify and motivate this approach by comparing it to well-known
alternatives, including behaviourism, instrumentalism and eliminativism. I also consider
some of the challenges that it faces | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | This project has received funding from the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological
development and demonstration under Grant agreement No. 331432. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 99, Iss. 3, pp.280-295 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1093/monist/onw005 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/22419 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Hegeler Institute | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher's policy. | en_GB |
dc.rights | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record. | |
dc.title | Fictionalism and the folk | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0026-9662 | |
dc.identifier.journal | The Monist | en_GB |