| dc.description.abstract | Diversity has been blamed for poor public goods provision in a number of
different contexts. It is associated with reduced spending on services, meager
rates of tax collection, and poor policies. I argue in this article, however, that
in semidemocratic or authoritarian countries, where political parties are weak,
diversity can be an important source of electoral competition, leading to better
services. In diverse communities where multiple identity groups are politically
mobilized, candidates are forced to seek the support of voters outside of their
group, who are more likely to vote based on qualifications than on group affiliation,
resulting in better public officials who provide superior services. Moreover, I
find internal group fragmentation to be important in understanding the impact
of heterogeneity on public goods provision: Candidates in areas where only
one identity group is politically mobilized but where that group is politically
fragmented will also seek votes from other groups within the community similar
to candidates in locations with “multigroup” mobilization, leading to improved
public goods provision. These arguments are confirmed through the analysis of
tribal mobilization and public goods across Jordan’s municipalities. | en_GB |
