This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.
Reason for embargo
Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis (ExE). In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the cognitive sciences. First, we outline the background of the debate and discuss different argumentative strategies for ExE. In particular, we distinguish ExE from cognate but more moderate claims about the embodied and situated nature of cognition and emotion (section 1). We then dwell upon two dimensions of ExE: emotions extended by material culture and by the social factors (section 2). We conclude by defending ExE against some objections (section 3) and point to desiderata for future research (section 4).
Thomas Szanto's work on this paper was generously supported by the European Union (EU) Horizon-2020 Marie Skłodowska-Curie Individual Fellowships research grant SHARE (655067): Shared Emotions, Group Membership, and Empathy.
Vol. 11, Iss. 12, December 2016, pp. 863–878