dc.contributor.author | Skidelsky, EBH | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-12-21T14:56:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-12-07 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper argues that happiness and pleasure are distinct states of mind because they stand in a distinct logical relation to belief. Roughly, being happy about a state of affairs s implies that one believes that s satisfies the description ‘s’ and that it is in some way good, whereas taking pleasure in s does not. In particular, Fred Feldman's analysis of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure overlooks this distinction. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 95 (3), pp. 435 - 446 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/00048402.2016.1251477 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/24966 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis (Routledge) for Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy | en_GB |
dc.subject | philosophical psychology | en_GB |
dc.subject | happiness | en_GB |
dc.subject | pleasure | en_GB |
dc.subject | Fred Feldman | en_GB |
dc.title | Happiness, pleasure, and belief | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 1471-6828 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Australasian Journal of Philosophy | en_GB |