Happiness, pleasure, and belief

dc.contributor.author	Skidelsky, EBH
dc.date.accessioned	2016-12-21T14:56:33Z
dc.date.issued	2016-12-07
dc.description.abstract	This paper argues that happiness and pleasure are distinct states of mind because they stand in a distinct logical relation to belief. Roughly, being happy about a state of affairs s implies that one believes that s satisfies the description ‘s’ and that it is in some way good, whereas taking pleasure in s does not. In particular, Fred Feldman's analysis of happiness in terms of attitudinal pleasure overlooks this distinction.	en_GB
dc.identifier.citation	Vol. 95 (3), pp. 435 - 446	en_GB
dc.identifier.doi	10.1080/00048402.2016.1251477
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10871/24966
dc.language.iso	en	en_GB
dc.publisher	Taylor & Francis (Routledge) for Australasian Association of Psychology and Philosophy	en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreason	Publisher policy	en_GB
dc.rights	© 2016 Australasian Association of Philosophy	en_GB
dc.subject	philosophical psychology	en_GB
dc.subject	happiness	en_GB
dc.subject	pleasure	en_GB
dc.subject	Fred Feldman	en_GB
dc.title	Happiness, pleasure, and belief	en_GB
dc.type	Article	en_GB
dc.identifier.issn	1471-6828
dc.description	This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record.	en_GB
dc.identifier.journal	Australasian Journal of Philosophy	en_GB