dc.contributor.author | Dimitrova, L | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-11T16:37:57Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-10-19 | |
dc.description.abstract | pecial purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment, structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional variation exists in SPACs' performance, which can be explained by the strong implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for acquisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors' involvement in the merged firm's governance improves long-term performance. This evidence has important implications given SPACs' high popularity in recent years and the new PE industry's trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 63, pp. 99 - 120 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jacceco.2016.10.003 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/25163 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | Crown Copyright © 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. | en_GB |
dc.subject | SPACs | en_GB |
dc.subject | Private equity | en_GB |
dc.subject | IPOs | en_GB |
dc.subject | Incentives | en_GB |
dc.subject | Contract design | en_GB |
dc.title | Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds” | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4101 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from the publisher via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |
dc.description | Available online 19 October 2016 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Accounting and Economics | en_GB |