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dc.contributor.authorWalker, H
dc.contributor.authorKavedžija, I
dc.date.accessioned2017-03-09T09:09:25Z
dc.date.issued2015-12-23
dc.description.abstractHow people conceive of happiness reveals much about who they are and the values they hold dear. The modern conception of happiness as private good feeling is the result of a long sequence of changes in dominant conceptions of the ends of life and of humanity’s place in the cosmos. This invites reflection on how the very vagueness of happiness can account for its powerful claim to render diverse values commensurable. In arguing for the importance of a critical, ethnographic approach to happiness— one concerned less with gauging how happy people are than with how happiness figures as an idea, mood, or motive in everyday life—we highlight its relationship to values, as well as questions of scope, virtue, and responsibility. Whether real or elusive, the pursuit of happiness structures time in specific ways and is largely other-oriented, insofar as one’s own happiness would seem best left in the hands of others.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 5 (3), pp. 1 - 23en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.14318/hau5.3.002
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/26356
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherHAU Society for Ethnographic Theoryen_GB
dc.rightsOpen access under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en_GB
dc.subjecthappinessen_GB
dc.subjectvaluesen_GB
dc.subjectmoral judgmenten_GB
dc.subjectwellbeingen_GB
dc.subjectmoral moodsen_GB
dc.subjectpurpose in lifeen_GB
dc.subjecttemporalityen_GB
dc.titleValues of happinessen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2017-03-09T09:09:25Z
dc.descriptionThis is the final version of the article. Available from HAU Society for Ethnographic Theory via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalHAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theoryen_GB


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