A demoicratic justification of differentiated integration in a heterogeneous EU

Abstract

Earlier scholarship assumed differentiated integration (DI) was pragmatic and temporary and that member states should and would converge on the same policies. By contrast, we contend that many instances of DI can be normatively justified on democratic grounds of fairness, impartiality and equity as suitable ways to accommodate economic, social and cultural heterogeneity. We distinguish between instrumental, constitutional and legislative differentiation and relate them respectively to problems of proportionality, partiality and difference. In so far as member states have unequal stakes in EU level collective decisions, reflecting their economic and social heterogeneity, or apply distinct constitutional norms to them, reflecting their cultural heterogeneity, then fairness and impartiality in decision-making justify respectively instrumental and constitutional DI, while the equity of regulations when applied to relevantly different agents and agencies warrant legislative forms of DI.