dc.contributor.author | Pleasants, NJ | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2017-10-06T14:52:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-10-16 | |
dc.description.abstract | I agree with those proponents of bio-medical moral enhancement who claim that we face large-scale global moral problems which are currently un-recognised or un-acted upon. But I argue that the proposed bio-medical means for tackling them is misconceived. I show that both bio-medical and ‘traditional’ conceptions of moral enhancement share a misleading picture of the relation between the moral psychology of individuals and the socially structured moral problems with which they are faced. The argument unfolds in three stages. First I reflect on prominent historical cases of large-scale progressive moral change to assess the role of the agents’ moral psychology in bringing that about and sustaining it. Second, I identify some current cases of people recognising one or more of (what I call) the ‘new moral problems’ but not acting in accordance with that recognition. Third, I adumbrate an alternative stance to the idea of both traditional and bio-medical moral enhancement. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | In: Hauskeller M, Coyne L (eds), Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives, pp. 87-107. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1017/S1358246118000309 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/29721 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 16 April 2019 in compliance with publisher policy. | en_GB |
dc.rights | © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2018. | |
dc.title | Would Aristotle have seen the wrongness of slavery if he had undergone a course of moral enhancement? | en_GB |
dc.type | Book chapter | en_GB |
dc.contributor.editor | Hauskeller, M | en_GB |
dc.contributor.editor | Coyne, L | en_GB |
dc.relation.isPartOf | Moral Enhancement: Critical Perspectives | en_GB |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press via the DOI in this record. | en_GB |