Direct Social Perception
Krueger, JW
Date: 31 October 2018
Book chapter
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Publisher DOI
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Abstract
Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive
capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires,
intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the
widespread assumption that mental states are ...
Defenders of a view called “direct social perception” (DSP) argue that our social-cognitive
capacities rest on our ability to directly perceive others’ mental states—their emotions, desires,
intentions, etc.—embodied in their expressive, goal-directed behavior. DSP thus challenges the
widespread assumption that mental states are intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible
to everyone but their owner. In this chapter, I consider a version of DSP that draws upon
phenomenology, 4E cognition, and empirical work in cognitive science. I first examine DSP in
its historical context, focusing on its development in the hands of phenomenologists like Husserl,
Scheler, and Merleau-Ponty. I then consider some supporting arguments and empirical
evidence—particularly work suggesting that embodied expressions of emotions (e.g., facial
expressions, gestures, etc.) may constitute part of the emotion itself. I conclude by defending
DSP against several objections.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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