Uncertainty, Cleavages and Ethnic Coalitions
Bormann, N
Date: 11 March 2019
Journal
Journal of Politics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Why do ethnically diverse elites share power in government coalitions? I argue that uncertainty
about their societal support makes ethnic leaders frequently form oversized coalitions
when their group does not represent an overwhelming majority. This uncertainty stems from
cross-cutting cleavage configurations, which enable coethnics ...
Why do ethnically diverse elites share power in government coalitions? I argue that uncertainty
about their societal support makes ethnic leaders frequently form oversized coalitions
when their group does not represent an overwhelming majority. This uncertainty stems from
cross-cutting cleavage configurations, which enable coethnics to hold membership in multiple
groups, and opens up the possibility of future defection to the opposition along shared identity
markers. In response, elites prefer coalitions that internalize cross-cutting cleavages as they restrict
defections to coalition partners and survive longer. To test these hypotheses, I collected
new data on linguistic, religious, and racial intra-group divisions. Using conditional choice
models on formation opportunities in 134 ethnically divided societies between 1946 and 2009
I find that, independent of institutional rules, ethnic elites frequently opt for oversized multiethnic
coalitions that share as many ethnic markers as possible. These coalitions survive longer
than more heterogeneous pacts.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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