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dc.contributor.authorBlagden, D
dc.date.accessioned2018-03-05T15:00:15Z
dc.date.issued2018-03-14
dc.description.abstractSince 2010, quinquennial UK National Security Strategies – and the Strategic Defence and Security Reviews that follow – have been based on a public National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The purpose of the NSRA is to identify and prioritize UK security risks for the coming five-yearly cycle based on their likelihood and impact. This article recognizes that trading off severity against likelihood is a valuable strategic heuristic. Yet it concludes that until the NSRA can address nine key limitations, it will remain a flawed exercise. Such findings carry implications for UK policy, and for other states operating NSRA-style risk matrices.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 14 March 2018en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/02684527.2018.1449366
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/31835
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 14 September 2019 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
dc.titleThe flawed promise of national security risk assessment: Nine lessons from the British approachen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0268-4527
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalIntelligence and National Securityen_GB


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