dc.contributor.author | Blagden, D | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-05T15:00:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2018-03-14 | |
dc.description.abstract | Since 2010, quinquennial UK National Security Strategies – and the Strategic Defence and Security Reviews that follow – have been based on a public National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA). The purpose of the NSRA is to identify and prioritize UK security risks for the coming five-yearly cycle based on their likelihood and impact. This article recognizes that trading off severity against likelihood is a valuable strategic heuristic. Yet it concludes that until the NSRA can address nine key limitations, it will remain a flawed exercise. Such findings carry implications for UK policy, and for other states operating NSRA-style risk matrices. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Published online 14 March 2018 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/02684527.2018.1449366 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/31835 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Taylor & Francis (Routledge) | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 14 September 2019 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group | |
dc.title | The flawed promise of national security risk assessment: Nine lessons from the British approach | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.identifier.issn | 0268-4527 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Intelligence and National Security | en_GB |