Against Thatcherite linguistics: Rule-following, speech communities, and biolanguage
Glackin, SN
Date: 5 June 2018
Article
Journal
Southern Journal of Philosophy
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Abstract
According to Chomsky and his followers, language as a biological
phenomenon is a property of individual minds and brains; its status as a social phenomenon is
merely epiphenomenal, and not a proper object of scientific study. On a rival view, the
individual's biological capacity for language cannot be properly understood in isolation ...
According to Chomsky and his followers, language as a biological
phenomenon is a property of individual minds and brains; its status as a social phenomenon is
merely epiphenomenal, and not a proper object of scientific study. On a rival view, the
individual's biological capacity for language cannot be properly understood in isolation from
the linguistic environment, which it both depends on for its operation and – in collaboration
with other speakers – builds and shapes for future generations.
I argue here for the rival view by demonstrating firstly its greater consonance with
several themes in current biological theory, and secondly its ability to answer two wellknown
philosophical challenges to generative linguistics due to Quine and Kripke.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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