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dc.contributor.authorTong, Z
dc.contributor.authorHuang, H
dc.date.accessioned2018-08-13T09:02:11Z
dc.date.issued2018-05-22
dc.description.abstractFirms in countries with higher union membership have less corporate cash holdings. This negative relation is stronger for firms in countries with weak employment protection legislation, firms in countries with a high degree of labor bargaining centralization, and financially constrained firms. Moreover, the market value of corporate cash holdings is lower for firms in countries with high union membership. The number of strikes and lockouts is higher in countries with more corporate cash holdings. We conclude that firms strategically choose corporate cash holdings to gain a bargaining position with labor in an international setting.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 41 (3), pp. 325-350en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/jfir.12152
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/33720
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 22 May 2020 in compliance with publisher policy.en_GB
dc.rights© 2018 The Southern Finance Association and the Southwestern Finance Associationen_GB
dc.titleLabor unions and corporate cash holdings: evidence from international dataen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.identifier.issn0270-2592
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Financial Researchen_GB
rioxxterms.versionAM
refterms.dateFCD2018-08-13T09:02:11Z
refterms.versionFCDAM


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