Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace
Bormann, N; Cederman, L-E; Gates, S; et al.Graham, BAT; Hug, S; Strom, KW; Wucherpfennig, J
Date: 6 December 2018
Journal
American Journal of Political Science
Publisher
Wiley for Midwest Political Science Association
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups
are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore
reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on
whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale
violence.We can improve our understanding ...
Grievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups
are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore
reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on
whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale
violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing
institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To
this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions
on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior.
Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with
information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship
on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal
power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset
mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.
Social and Political Sciences, Philosophy, and Anthropology
Faculty of Humanities, Arts and Social Sciences
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