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dc.contributor.authorWilkinson, S
dc.date.accessioned2018-10-23T11:17:51Z
dc.date.issued2016-01-01
dc.description.abstractI present a view of belief (called the "downstream-only view") according to which there can be belief without evidence. I defend it against two influential objections. The first objection is grounded in the intuition that belief "aims at truth". The second objection is that, since there are states that intuitively aren't beliefs but that explain action in the same way, we need upstream considerations to tell these belief and non-belief states aparten_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 35 (1), pp. 13-34en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/34395
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherUniversidad de Oviedoen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/44077427en_GB
dc.relation.urlwww.unioviedo.es/Teoremaen_GB
dc.rights© 2016 The Authoren_GB
dc.subjectbeliefen_GB
dc.subjectnormsen_GB
dc.subjectevidenceen_GB
dc.subjectactionen_GB
dc.subjectaliefen_GB
dc.titleCan there be belief without evidence?en_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2018-10-23T11:17:51Z
dc.identifier.issn0210-1602
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available via JSTOR via the link in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalTeorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofíaen_GB


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