dc.contributor.author | Wilkinson, S | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-23T11:17:51Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2016-01-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | I present a view of belief (called the "downstream-only view") according to which there can be belief without evidence. I defend it against two influential objections. The first objection is grounded in the intuition that belief "aims at truth". The second objection is that, since there are states that intuitively aren't beliefs but that explain action in the same way, we need upstream considerations to tell these belief and non-belief states apart | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 35 (1), pp. 13-34 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/34395 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Universidad de Oviedo | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | https://www.jstor.org/stable/44077427 | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | www.unioviedo.es/Teorema | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2016 The Author | en_GB |
dc.subject | belief | en_GB |
dc.subject | norms | en_GB |
dc.subject | evidence | en_GB |
dc.subject | action | en_GB |
dc.subject | alief | en_GB |
dc.title | Can there be belief without evidence? | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2018-10-23T11:17:51Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0210-1602 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available via JSTOR via the link in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía | en_GB |