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dc.contributor.authorMonciardini, D
dc.contributor.authorConaldi, G
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-23T11:15:33Z
dc.date.issued2019-04-02
dc.description.abstractIntended beneficiaries have an undeniable relevance to regulation. However, current research has focused mainly on the two-party relationship between rule-making and rule-taking. We attempt to fill this gap by exploring the formal and informal roles that beneficiaries’ intermediaries played in cocreating European Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) rules and associated practices between 2000 and 2017. By linking recent conceptualizations of regulatory intermediaries with the literature on critical political CSR, we offer a more dynamic and contextualized understanding of the roles of beneficiaries’ intermediaries. Specifically, we identify six micro-dynamics through which they influenced the regulatory process. Notably, our findings highlight how the convergence of interests between three groups of beneficiaries’ intermediaries – the NIU (NGO-Investor-Union) nexus – had a key role in reshaping CSR rules. We conclude that, in the European context, the involvement of stronger and better coordinated beneficiaries’ intermediaries is crucial in order to achieve more effective corporate conduct regulation.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationPublished online 2 April 2019en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/rego.12248
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/35569
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 2 April 2021 in compliance with publisher policy
dc.rights© 2019 John Wiley & Sons Australia, Ltd
dc.subjectcorporate social responsibilityen_GB
dc.subjectcorporate reportingen_GB
dc.subjectEU regulationen_GB
dc.subjectregulatory intermediariesen_GB
dc.subjectresponsible investmenten_GB
dc.titleThe European regulation of corporate social responsibility: The role of beneficiaries' intermediariesen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-01-23T11:15:33Z
dc.identifier.issn1748-5991
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalRegulation and Governanceen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-01-22
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-01-22
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-01-22T18:32:48Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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