Frameworks for Historians and Philosophers

Abstract

The past can be a stubborn subject: it is complex, heterogeneous, and opaque. To understand it, one must decide which aspects of the past to emphasize and which to minimize. Enter frameworks. Frameworks foreground certain aspects of the historical record while backgrounding others. As such, they are both necessary for, and conducive to, good history as well as good philosophy. We examine the role of frameworks in the history and philosophy of science and argue that they are necessary for both forms of inquiry. We then suggest that the right attitude toward frameworks is pluralism rather than monism: there is no single correct framework to be applied to a given scientific episode. Rather, a multitude of different frameworks are more or less appropriate given various contexts and aims. From this perspective, good frameworks generate and further, rather than frustrate, historical and philosophical inquiry. Our view sheds light on historical disagreement and on the relationship between philosophy and history of science.