dc.contributor.author | Walsh, K | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-03-22T09:47:25Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2017-12-01 | |
dc.description.abstract | Newton’s earliest publications contained scandalous epistemological claims: not only did he aim for certainty; he also claimed success. Some commentators argue that Newton ultimately gave up claims of certainty in favor of a high degree of probability. I argue that no such shift occurred. I examine the evidence of a probabilistic shift: a passage from query 23/31 of the Opticks and rule 4 of the Principia. Neither passage supports a probabilistic approach to natural philosophy. The aim of certainty, then, was an enduring feature of Newton’s methodology. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 84, pp. 866 - 878 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/693963 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/36597 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press / Philosophy of Science Association | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2017 University of Chicago Press | en_GB |
dc.title | Newton: from certainty to probability? | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2019-03-22T09:47:25Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0031-8248 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available from University of Chicago Press via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Philosophy of Science | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | http://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserved | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2017-12-01 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2017-12-01 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2019-03-22T09:45:53Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | VoR | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2019-03-22T09:47:28Z | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |