End‐of‐day price manipulation and M&As
Cumming, D; Ji, S; Johan, S; et al.Tarsalewska, M
Date: 28 June 2019
Journal
British Journal of Management
Publisher
Wiley
Publisher DOI
Abstract
Based on M&As from over 45 countries from 2003-2014, we show that the presence of endof-day (EOD) target price manipulation prior to M&As increases the probability of an M&A
deal withdrawal, and decreases the premium paid. More detailed exchange trading rules that
govern manipulation across countries and over time lower the probability ...
Based on M&As from over 45 countries from 2003-2014, we show that the presence of endof-day (EOD) target price manipulation prior to M&As increases the probability of an M&A
deal withdrawal, and decreases the premium paid. More detailed exchange trading rules that
govern manipulation across countries and over time lower the probability of withdrawal,
mitigate the negative impact of EOD manipulation on withdrawal, and raise premiums paid.
Finally, while there are fewer cases of acquirer price manipulations prior to M&As, the data
indicates positive acquirer price manipulation in share M&As and increases the probability of
deal withdrawal.
Finance and Accounting
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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