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dc.contributor.authorLewis, D
dc.date.accessioned2019-09-30T12:42:00Z
dc.date.issued2019-04-15
dc.description.abstractKey Findings • During a year of critical presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine, the risk of instability remains high, but a major military offensive by Russia is unlikely. Russian policy can be interpreted as a form of “strategic deterrence,” in which Moscow seeks to achieve its goals in Ukraine through a policy of active containment and strategic patience while avoiding overt military conflict. • In current Russian usage, “strategic deterrence” is the use of both military and nonmilitary means to prevent strategic gains by an opponent. It combines military means short of the use of force, such as an aggressive military build-up, with non-military tactics, including diplomacy, peace negotiations, information warfare, and political tactics. This strategy has allowed Russia to consolidate control of the Crimean peninsula, the Donbas region, and the Kerch Strait with only limited use of regular military forces. • In the longer term, however, the strategic deterrence mind-set poses problems for Russia. First, it escalates every local conflict in Russia’s borderlands into a high-level strategic game between Russia and the West, ensuring a long-term crisis in Moscow’s relations with the West, and limiting Russia's influence inside Ukraine. Second, instead of resolving conflicts, it produces militarized, stalemate-prone outcomes, leaving Russia entangled in a belt of semi frozen conflicts around its borders.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationMarshall Center Security Insights 29en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/38974
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherGeorge C. Marshall European Center for Security Studiesen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttps://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/en/nav-fix-sec-insights/2670-russia-s-strategic-deterrence-in-ukraine.htmlen_GB
dc.rights© 2019 George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studiesen_GB
dc.subjectUkraineen_GB
dc.subjectRussiaen_GB
dc.subjectStrategyen_GB
dc.subjectDeterrenceen_GB
dc.titleRussia’s “Strategic Deterrence” in Ukraineen_GB
dc.typeReporten_GB
dc.date.available2019-04-15en_GB
dc.date.available2019-09-30T12:42:00Z
pubs.notesNot knownen_GB
dc.descriptionThis is the final version. Available from the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies via the link in this recorden_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
rioxxterms.versionVoRen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-04-15
rioxxterms.typeOtheren_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-09-30T12:39:38Z
refterms.versionFCDVoR
refterms.dateFOA2019-10-03T14:28:28Z


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