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dc.contributor.authorAlbuquerque, R
dc.contributor.authorLei, Z
dc.contributor.authorRocholl, J
dc.contributor.authorZhang, C
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-06T13:01:21Z
dc.date.issued2019-11-06
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision on Citizens United vs. FEC had on corporate political activism. The decision opened the door for corporate treasuries to engage in independent political spending. Politically connected firms have lower announcement returns at the ruling than non-connected firms. The estimates suggest that the value of a political connection decreases by $6.9 million. To evaluate the effect of Citizens United on corporate political activism, we explore the fact that Citizens United also lifts bans on independent political spending in states where such bans existed. After the ruling, firms headquartered in states where bans are lifted have fewer state-level connections relative to firms in other states. Overall, our evidence supports the hypothesis that independent political spending crowds out political connections. We do not find any significant crowding-out effects of independent political expenditures on lobbying activity, executive contributions, and political action committees (PAC) contributions.en_GB
dc.description.sponsorshipPortuguese Foundation for Science and Technology-FCTen_GB
dc.identifier.citationArticle 101547en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101547
dc.identifier.grantnumberPTDC/IIM-FIN/2977/2014en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/39543
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 6 May 2021 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2019. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  en_GB
dc.subjectCorporate political activismen_GB
dc.subjectpolitical connectionsen_GB
dc.subjectCitizens Uniteden_GB
dc.subjectstock returnsen_GB
dc.titleCitizens United vs. FEC and Corporate Political Activismen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2019-11-06T13:01:21Z
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this recorden_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Corporate Financeen_GB
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  en_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2019-11-04
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2019-11-04
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2019-11-05T16:20:45Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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© 2019. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/  
Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2019. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/