Citizens United vs. FEC and Corporate Political Activism
dc.contributor.author | Albuquerque, R | |
dc.contributor.author | Lei, Z | |
dc.contributor.author | Rocholl, J | |
dc.contributor.author | Zhang, C | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-11-06T13:01:21Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2019-11-06 | |
dc.description.abstract | This paper analyzes the effect that the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark decision on Citizens United vs. FEC had on corporate political activism. The decision opened the door for corporate treasuries to engage in independent political spending. Politically connected firms have lower announcement returns at the ruling than non-connected firms. The estimates suggest that the value of a political connection decreases by $6.9 million. To evaluate the effect of Citizens United on corporate political activism, we explore the fact that Citizens United also lifts bans on independent political spending in states where such bans existed. After the ruling, firms headquartered in states where bans are lifted have fewer state-level connections relative to firms in other states. Overall, our evidence supports the hypothesis that independent political spending crowds out political connections. We do not find any significant crowding-out effects of independent political expenditures on lobbying activity, executive contributions, and political action committees (PAC) contributions. | en_GB |
dc.description.sponsorship | Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology-FCT | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Article 101547 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2019.101547 | |
dc.identifier.grantnumber | PTDC/IIM-FIN/2977/2014 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/39543 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights.embargoreason | Under embargo until 6 May 2021 in compliance with publisher policy | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2019. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dc.subject | Corporate political activism | en_GB |
dc.subject | political connections | en_GB |
dc.subject | Citizens United | en_GB |
dc.subject | stock returns | en_GB |
dc.title | Citizens United vs. FEC and Corporate Political Activism | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2019-11-06T13:01:21Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | |
dc.description | This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Corporate Finance | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2019-11-04 | |
rioxxterms.version | AM | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2019-11-04 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2019-11-05T16:20:45Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.panel | C | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2019. This version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/