When do campaign contributions matter? This paper advances the claim that a group
that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve
legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3)
without attracting negative attention. Using an original dataset ...
When do campaign contributions matter? This paper advances the claim that a group
that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve
legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3)
without attracting negative attention. Using an original dataset based on the written comments
of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform
legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a
significant relationship between lobby groups’ campaign contributions and their legislative
success, and at distinct units of analysis – the group, the side, and the group-senator dyad. The
relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amendments in committee. The
unprecedented data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups’ legislative
victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies
could not identify.
