Does gender diversity on banks’ boards matter? Evidence from public bailouts
dc.contributor.author | Onali, E | |
dc.contributor.author | Cardillo, G | |
dc.contributor.author | Torluccio, G | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2020-01-06T11:32:15Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2020-01-09 | |
dc.description.abstract | We are the first to examine the impact of gender diversity on banks’ boards on the probability and size of public bailouts. Our findings, based on a sample of listed European banks over the period 2005-2017, suggest that banks with more gender-diverse boards are less likely to receive a public bailout and receive a lower amount of bailout funds as a percentage of total assets than banks with less gender-diverse boards. Specifically, an increase by one standard deviation in gender diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by at least 2.44%, a significant reduction considering that the unconditional probability is 18.7%. Gender diversity is also positively related to bank performance, as proxied by ROA and Tobin’s Q and with dividend payout ratios, consistent with the hypothesis that female directors are better monitors than male directors. These results are robust to a variety of econometric approaches and provide support for recent reforms in several EU countries regarding gender quotas. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Article 101560 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101560 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10871/40250 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.rights | © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/) | |
dc.title | Does gender diversity on banks’ boards matter? Evidence from public bailouts | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2020-01-06T11:32:15Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0929-1199 | |
dc.description | This is the final version. Available on open access from Elsevier via the DOI in this record | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | Journal of Corporate Finance | en_GB |
dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | en_GB |
dcterms.dateAccepted | 2020-01-02 | |
rioxxterms.version | VoR | en_GB |
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate | 2020-01-02 | |
rioxxterms.type | Journal Article/Review | en_GB |
refterms.dateFCD | 2020-01-05T12:20:11Z | |
refterms.versionFCD | AM | |
refterms.dateFOA | 2020-01-20T11:05:44Z | |
refterms.panel | Unspecified | en_GB |
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Except where otherwise noted, this item's licence is described as © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/)