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dc.contributor.authorBlagden, D
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-24T13:41:24Z
dc.date.issued2020-02-04
dc.description.abstractCan cyberattacks be deterred? As the capability and associated damage potential of cyber weapons rises, this question will become ever more important to publics and their policymakers around the world. The principal obstacle to deterring cyberattacks via the threat of retaliatory punishment is usually taken to be such attacks’ ability to be made technically untraceable: absent a ‘return address’ for the aggression suffered, how could the victim of such an anonymous attack know where to direct its retaliation? Such concerns are overblown, however, for they conflate two distinct variables within the deterrence calculus: aggressor identity and aggressor interests. In fact, once cyberattack is understood as the coercive political act that it is, the ‘anonymity problem’ for cyber deterrence dwindles. This is because, in seeking to advance a cause via cyber coercion, an attacker must necessarily reveal a set of interests that it values. Such interests can then be held at risk by the party seeking deterrence, even if the attacker’s identity itself remains concealed.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 62 (1), pp. 131-148en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/00396338.2020.1715072
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10871/40562
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherTaylor & Francis (Routledge)en_GB
dc.rights.embargoreasonUnder embargo until 4 August 2021 in compliance with publisher policyen_GB
dc.rights© 2020 Taylor & Francis
dc.titleDeterring Cyber Coercion: The Exaggerated Problem of Attributionen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2020-01-24T13:41:24Z
dc.identifier.issn0039-6338
dc.identifier.issn1468-2699
dc.descriptionThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Taylor & Francis via the DOI in this record.en_GB
dc.identifier.journalSurvival: Global Politics and Strategyen_GB
dc.rights.urihttp://www.rioxx.net/licenses/all-rights-reserveden_GB
dcterms.dateAccepted2020-01-02
rioxxterms.versionAMen_GB
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-01-02
rioxxterms.typeJournal Article/Reviewen_GB
refterms.dateFCD2020-01-24T12:46:50Z
refterms.versionFCDAM
refterms.panelCen_GB


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