Imperfect competition and corporate governance

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Imperfect competition and corporate governance

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dc.contributor.author Kelsey, David en_GB
dc.contributor.author Milne, Frank en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2010-06-02T10:33:42Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:26:00Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:53:21Z
dc.date.issued 2008-12 en_GB
dc.description.abstract This paper studies the objective function of the firm in imperfectly competitive industries. If those involved in decisions are also consumers the usual monopoly distortion is reduced. In oligopolistic industries, this may give the firm a strategic advantage and hence, in the right circumstances, will increase profit. If the firm cannot commit not to change its constitution, we find a Coase-like result where all market power is lost in the limit. This enables us to endogenise the objective function of the firm. Finally we present a more abstract model of governance in the presence of market distortions. en_GB
dc.description.sponsorship Research in part support by ESRC grant RES-000-22-0650 and a grant from the British Academy. en_GB
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2008, 10 (6) p.1115-1141 en_GB
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00399.x en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/100158 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher Blackwell en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Queen's University, Department of Economics Working Papers en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries no. 1079 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00399.x en_GB
dc.subject Corporate governance en_GB
dc.subject Competition en_GB
dc.title Imperfect competition and corporate governance en_GB
dc.type Article en_GB
dc.date.available 2010-06-02T10:33:42Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:26:00Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:53:21Z
dc.identifier.issn 10973923 en_GB
dc.identifier.issn 14679779 en_GB
dc.description Earlier version of this article dated April 17, 2006 issued as working paper. Final version published in Journal of Public Economic Theory available online at http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/ en_GB
dc.identifier.journal Journal of Public Economic Theory en_GB


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