Optimal allocation without transfer payments

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Optimal allocation without transfer payments

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dc.contributor.author Chakravarty, Surajeet en_GB
dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2010-08-10T11:31:31Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:37Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:52:55Z
dc.date.issued 2010-02 en_GB
dc.description.abstract Often an organization or government must allocate goods without collecting payment in return. This may pose a difficult problem either when agents receiving those goods have private information in regards to their values or needs or when discriminating among agents using known di¤erences is not a viable option. In this paper, we find an optimal mechanism to allocate goods when the designer is benevolent. While the designer cannot charge agents, he can receive a costly but wasteful signal from them. We find conditions for which ignoring these costly signals by giving agents equal share (or using lotteries if the goods are indivisible) is optimal. In other cases, those that send the highest signal should receive the goods; however, we then show that there exist cases where more complicated mechanisms are superior. Finally, we show that the optimal mechanism is independent of the scarcity of the goods being allocated. en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/109383 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher University of Exeter Business School en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries Economics Department discussion paper series en_GB
dc.relation.ispartofseries 10/04 en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/economics/papers/ en_GB
dc.relation.url http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/documents/papers/economics/2010/1004.pdf en_GB
dc.subject resource allocation en_GB
dc.title Optimal allocation without transfer payments en_GB
dc.type Working Paper en_GB
dc.date.available 2010-08-10T11:31:31Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:37Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:52:55Z
dc.identifier.issn 1473 – 3307 en_GB
dc.description Discussion paper en_GB


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