Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost

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Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost

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dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.author Luski, Israel en_GB
dc.contributor.author Wettstein, David en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-04-03T11:13:17Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:57Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:55:18Z
dc.date.issued 2003-10 en_GB
dc.description.abstract We analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time-dependent rewards and sunk costs. When firms are identical, innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward. When one firm has higher profit potential, it is more likely to innovate first. Our framework generalizes an all-pay auction; however, we show that under certain conditions there is qualitatively different equilibrium behavior. en_GB
dc.identifier.citation International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 21(8), October 2003, p. 1111-1133 en_GB
dc.identifier.doi doi:10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00033-X en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/22202 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher Elsevier en_GB
dc.relation.url http://0-www.sciencedirect.com.lib.ex.ac.uk:80/science/journal/01677187 en_GB
dc.subject Innovation en_GB
dc.subject Sunk costs en_GB
dc.subject All-pay auctions en_GB
dc.subject research and development en_GB
dc.title Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost en_GB
dc.type Article en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-04-03T11:13:17Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:57Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:55:18Z
dc.identifier.issn 0167-7187 en_GB
dc.identifier.journal International Journal of Industrial Organization en_GB


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