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Innovative Activity with Sunk Cost

dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorLuski, Israelen_GB
dc.contributor.authorWettstein, Daviden_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-03T11:13:17Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:57Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:55:18Z
dc.date.issued2003-10en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe analyze innovative activity in a general framework with time-dependent rewards and sunk costs. When firms are identical, innovation is delayed by an increase in the number of firms or a decrease in the size of the reward. When one firm has higher profit potential, it is more likely to innovate first. Our framework generalizes an all-pay auction; however, we show that under certain conditions there is qualitatively different equilibrium behavior.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 21(8), October 2003, p. 1111-1133en_GB
dc.identifier.doidoi:10.1016/S0167-7187(03)00033-Xen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/22202en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://0-www.sciencedirect.com.lib.ex.ac.uk:80/science/journal/01677187en_GB
dc.subjectInnovationen_GB
dc.subjectSunk costsen_GB
dc.subjectAll-pay auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectresearch and developmenten_GB
dc.titleInnovative Activity with Sunk Costen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2008-04-03T11:13:17Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:57Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:55:18Z
dc.identifier.issn0167-7187en_GB
dc.identifier.journalInternational Journal of Industrial Organizationen_GB


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