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All-pay auctions with variable rewards

dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorLuski, Israelen_GB
dc.contributor.authorSela, Aneren_GB
dc.contributor.authorWettstein, Daviden_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeteren_GB
dc.contributor.departmentBen Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-24T15:56:21Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:20Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:55:33Z
dc.date.issued2003-03-27en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe study all–pay auctions with variable rewards under incomplete information. In standard models, a reward depends on a bidder’s privately known type; however, in our model it is also a function of his bid. We show that in such models there is a potential for paradoxical behavior where a reduction in the rewards or an increase in costs may increase the expected sum of bids or alternatively the expected highest bid.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Industrial Economics, December 2002 L (4): 417-430en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1467-6451.00184
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/24123en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherBlackwellen_GB
dc.subjectauctionsen_GB
dc.subjectprice quotationsen_GB
dc.subjectcontracten_GB
dc.subjecttenderingen_GB
dc.titleAll-pay auctions with variable rewardsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2008-04-24T15:56:21Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:20Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:55:33Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-1821 (print)en_GB
dc.identifier.issn1467-6451 (online)en_GB
dc.descriptionAvailable online from Blackwell Synergyen_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Industrial Economicsen_GB


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