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Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment

dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorWettstein, Daviden_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeteren_GB
dc.contributor.departmentBen Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-04-24T15:56:57Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:50Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:54:02Z
dc.date.issued2006-09-01en_GB
dc.description.abstractThe article focuses on spending caps, and compares those used in politics with many examples in sports economics. In 1999, the party of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was fined $3.2 million for exceeding Israel's campaign finance caps. Financing caps by the National Collegiate Athletics Association did not prevent The University of Oregon from spending $3 million on their football locker room. Mathematical models are provided in order to prove that spending caps will not necessarily have their intended effect, as they increase the total expended amount by increasing the risk of being fined.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVol. 96 Issue 4, p1351-1354en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1257/aer.96.4.1351en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/24124en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherAmerican Economic Associationen_GB
dc.subjectpolitical lobbyingen_GB
dc.subjectIsraelen_GB
dc.subjectcampaign fundsen_GB
dc.subjectfundraisingen_GB
dc.titleCaps on Political Lobbying: Commenten_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2008-04-24T15:56:57Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:50Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:54:02Z
dc.identifier.issn00028282en_GB
dc.identifier.journalAmerican Economic Reviewen_GB


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