| dc.contributor.author | Kaplan, Todd R. | en_GB |
| dc.contributor.author | Wettstein, David | en_GB |
| dc.contributor.department | University of Exeter | en_GB |
| dc.contributor.department | Ben Gurion University of the Negev | en_GB |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2008-04-24T15:56:57Z | en_GB |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-01-25T10:25:50Z | en_GB |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-19T15:54:02Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2006-09-01 | en_GB |
| dc.description.abstract | The article focuses on spending caps, and compares those used in politics with many examples in sports economics. In 1999, the party of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was fined $3.2 million for exceeding Israel's campaign finance caps. Financing caps by the National Collegiate Athletics Association did not prevent The University of Oregon from spending $3 million on their football locker room. Mathematical models are provided in order to prove that spending caps will not necessarily have their intended effect, as they increase the total expended amount by increasing the risk of being fined. | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 96 Issue 4, p1351-1354 | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1257/aer.96.4.1351 | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10036/24124 | en_GB |
| dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
| dc.publisher | American Economic Association | en_GB |
| dc.subject | political lobbying | en_GB |
| dc.subject | Israel | en_GB |
| dc.subject | campaign funds | en_GB |
| dc.subject | fundraising | en_GB |
| dc.title | Caps on Political Lobbying: Comment | en_GB |
| dc.type | Article | en_GB |
| dc.date.available | 2008-04-24T15:56:57Z | en_GB |
| dc.date.available | 2011-01-25T10:25:50Z | en_GB |
| dc.date.available | 2013-03-19T15:54:02Z | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0002-8282 | en_GB |
| dc.identifier.journal | American Economic Review | en_GB |
