Why banks should keep secrets

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Why banks should keep secrets

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dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-04-29T15:43:34Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:57Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:51:05Z
dc.date.issued 2006-02 en_GB
dc.description.abstract We show that it is sometimes efficient for a bank to commit to a policy that keeps information about its risky assets private. Our model, based upon Diamond-Dybvig (1983), has the feature that banks acquire information about their risky assets before depositors acquire it. A bank has the option of using contracts where the middle-period return on deposits is contingent on this information, but by doing so it must also reveal the information. We derive the conditions on depositors preferences and banking technology for which a bank would prefer to keep information secret even though it must then use a non-contingent deposit contract. en_GB
dc.identifier.citation Economic Theory, February 2006 27, 341–357 en_GB
dc.identifier.doi 10.1007/s00199-004-0597-y en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/24456 en_GB
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.publisher Springer en_GB
dc.relation.url http://www.springerlink.com/ en_GB
dc.subject Deposit contracts en_GB
dc.subject Interim information. en_GB
dc.subject Banks en_GB
dc.subject Confidentiality en_GB
dc.title Why banks should keep secrets en_GB
dc.type Article en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-04-29T15:43:34Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:57Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:51:05Z
dc.identifier.issn 09382259 en_GB
dc.identifier.issn 14320479 en_GB
dc.identifier.journal Economic Theory en_GB


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