Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm

dc.contributor.author	Kelsey, David	en_GB
dc.contributor.author	Milne, Frank	en_GB
dc.contributor.department	University of Exeter; Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario	en_GB
dc.date.accessioned	2008-06-02T10:29:29Z	en_GB
dc.date.accessioned	2011-01-25T10:25:37Z	en_GB
dc.date.accessioned	2013-03-19T15:50:59Z
dc.date.issued	2004-07	en_GB
dc.description.abstract	This paper provides a theory of general equilibrium with externalities and/or monopoly. We assume that the firm's decisions are based on the preferences of shareholders and/or other stakeholders. Under these assumptions a firm will produce fewer negative externalities than the comparable profit maximising firm. In the absence of externalities, equilibrium with a monopoly will be Pareto efficient if the firm can price discriminate. The equilibrium can be implemented by a 2-part tariff.	en_GB
dc.identifier.citation	University of Birmingham Economics Working Paper No. 02-01	en_GB
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10036/29312	en_GB
dc.language.iso	en	en_GB
dc.publisher	University of Birmingham	en_GB
dc.relation.url	http://ssrn.com/abstract=692064	en_GB
dc.subject	Externality	en_GB
dc.subject	general equilibrium	en_GB
dc.subject	2-part tariff	en_GB
dc.subject	objective function of the firm	en_GB
dc.title	Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm	en_GB
dc.type	Working Paper	en_GB
dc.date.available	2008-06-02T10:29:29Z	en_GB
dc.date.available	2011-01-25T10:25:37Z	en_GB
dc.date.available	2013-03-19T15:50:59Z