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Second-price auctions with private entry costs

dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorSela, Aneren_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-04T11:29:42Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:25Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:51:14Z
dc.date.issued2006-09en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe study asymmetric second-price auctions under incomplete information. The bidders have potentially different, commonly-known, valuations for the object and private information about their entry costs. The seller, however, does not benefit from these entry costs. We calculate the equilibrium strategies of the bidders and analyze the optimal design for the seller in this environment.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.2139/ssrn.442521en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/29492en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherSSRNen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=442521en_GB
dc.subjectAsymmetric auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectSymmetric auctionsen_GB
dc.subjectEntry costsen_GB
dc.titleSecond-price auctions with private entry costsen_GB
dc.typeWorking Paperen_GB
dc.date.available2008-06-04T11:29:42Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:25Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:51:14Z
dc.identifier.issn1556-5068en_GB
dc.identifier.journalSSRN Electronic Journalen_GB


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