Which way to cooperate

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Which way to cooperate

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dc.contributor.author Kaplan, Todd R. en_GB
dc.contributor.author Ruffle, Bradley J. en_GB
dc.contributor.department University of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2008-06-04T11:30:13Z en_GB
dc.date.accessioned 2011-01-25T10:25:42Z en_US
dc.date.accessioned 2013-03-19T15:52:39Z
dc.date.issued 2007-06 en_GB
dc.description.abstract Cooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely solely on a player's private value to defection. The second cooperative strategy is to take turns, which relies on publicly available information. Our initial experiments reveal that almost all cooperators adopt cutoff strategies. However, follow-up experiments in which the distribution of values to defection are made more similar show that all cooperators now take turns. Our results offer insight into what form a cooperative norm will take: for mundane tasks or where individuals otherwise have similar payoffs, taking turns is likely; for difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or by preferences, cutoff cooperation will emerge. en_GB
dc.identifier.citation Volume 122, Issue 563, pages 1042–1068, September 2012 en_US
dc.identifier.doi 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.x en_US
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/10036/29493 en_GB
dc.identifier.uri http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0297 en_US
dc.language.iso en en_GB
dc.relation.url http://ssrn.com/abstract=990942 en_GB
dc.subject experimental economics en_GB
dc.subject cooperation en_GB
dc.subject incomplete information en_GB
dc.subject alternating en_GB
dc.subject cutoff strategies en_GB
dc.subject random payoffs en_GB
dc.title Which way to cooperate en_GB
dc.date.available 2008-06-04T11:30:13Z en_GB
dc.date.available 2011-01-25T10:25:42Z en_US
dc.date.available 2013-03-19T15:52:39Z
dc.description Draft dated June 2007 deposited in SSRN Working Paper series. Final version published in The Economic Journal by Wiley; available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
dc.identifier.journal The Economic Journal en_US
dc.publisher.commercial Wiley en_GB


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