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dc.contributor.authorKaplan, Todd R.en_GB
dc.contributor.authorRuffle, Bradley J.en_GB
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Exeter; Ben-Gurion University of the Negeven_GB
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-04T11:30:13Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-25T10:25:42Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:52:39Z
dc.date.issued2007-06en_GB
dc.description.abstractCooperation in real-world dilemmas takes many forms. We introduce a class of two-player games that permits two distinct ways to cooperate in the repeated game. One way to cooperate is to play cutoff strategies, which rely solely on a player's private value to defection. The second cooperative strategy is to take turns, which relies on publicly available information. Our initial experiments reveal that almost all cooperators adopt cutoff strategies. However, follow-up experiments in which the distribution of values to defection are made more similar show that all cooperators now take turns. Our results offer insight into what form a cooperative norm will take: for mundane tasks or where individuals otherwise have similar payoffs, taking turns is likely; for difficult tasks that differentiate individuals by skill or by preferences, cutoff cooperation will emerge.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVolume 122, Issue 563, pages 1042–1068, September 2012en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02485.xen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/29493en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1468-0297en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://ssrn.com/abstract=990942en_GB
dc.subjectexperimental economicsen_GB
dc.subjectcooperationen_GB
dc.subjectincomplete informationen_GB
dc.subjectalternatingen_GB
dc.subjectcutoff strategiesen_GB
dc.subjectrandom payoffsen_GB
dc.titleWhich way to cooperateen_GB
dc.date.available2008-06-04T11:30:13Zen_GB
dc.date.available2011-01-25T10:25:42Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:52:39Z
dc.descriptionDraft dated June 2007 deposited in SSRN Working Paper series. Final version published in The Economic Journal by Wiley; available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
dc.identifier.journalThe Economic Journalen_GB
dc.publisher.commercialWileyen_GB


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