Strategic complements, substitutes, and ambiguity: the implications for public goods

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Strategic complements, substitutes, and ambiguity: the implications for public goods

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Title: Strategic complements, substitutes, and ambiguity: the implications for public goods
Author: Eichberger, J├╝rgen
Kelsey, David
Citation: Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 106, 436-466
Publisher: Elsevier
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory
Date Issued: 2002-10
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10036/29995
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2898
Links: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220531
Abstract: We examine the effect of ambiguity in symmetric games with aggregate externalities. We find that ambiguity will increase/decrease the equilibrium strategy in games with strategic complements/substitutes and positive externalities. These effects are reversed in games with negative externalities. We consider some economic applications of these results to Cournot oligopoly, bargaining, macroeconomic coordination, and voluntary donations to a public good. In particular we show that ambiguity may reduce free-riding. Comparative statics analysis shows that increases in uncertainty will increase donations, to a public good.
Type: Article
Description: Author's pre-print draft
Keywords: AmbiguityStrategic complementsPublic goodsChoquet integralFree rider
ISSN: 0022053110957235
Funders/Sponsor: Research supported by ESRC senior research fellowship, Award H52427502595, ESRC Grant R000222597


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