Sequential two-player games with ambiguity
Eichberger, Jürgen; Kelsey, David
Date: 1 November 2004
Journal
International Economic Review
Publisher
Blackwell
Publisher DOI
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Abstract
If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our ...
If players' beliefs are strictly nonadditive, the Dempster–Shafer updating rule can be used to define beliefs off the equilibrium path. We define an equilibrium concept in sequential two-person games where players update their beliefs with the Dempster–Shafer updating rule. We show that in the limit as uncertainty tends to zero, our equilibrium approximates Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We argue that our equilibrium can be used to define a refinement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium by imposing context-dependent constraints on beliefs under uncertainty.
Economics
Faculty of Environment, Science and Economy
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