Show simple item record

dc.contributor.authorKotsogiannis, Christosen_GB
dc.contributor.authorSerfes, Konstantinosen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2011-07-11T14:08:12Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:50:19Z
dc.date.issued2010-04en_GB
dc.description.abstractA rather neglected issue in the tax competition literature is the dependence of equilibrium outcomes on the presence of firms and shoppers (two-sided markets). Making use of a model of vertical and horizontal differentiation, within which jurisdictions compete by providing public goods and levying taxes in order to attract firms and shoppers, this paper characterizes the noncooperative equilibrium. It also evaluates the welfare implications for the jurisdictions of a popular policy of tax coordination: The imposition of a minimum tax. It is shown that the interaction of the two markets affects the intensity of tax competition and the degree of optimal vertical differentiation chosen by the competing jurisdictions. Though the noncooperative equilibrium is, as it is typically the case, inefficient such inefficiency is mitigated by the strength of the interaction in the two markets. A minimum tax policy is shown to be effective when the strength of the interaction is weak and ineffective when it is strong.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationJournal of Public Economic Theory, 12 (2), 2010, pp. 281–321.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01439.xen_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/3180en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/en_GB
dc.subjectPublic goodsen_GB
dc.subjectTax competitionen_GB
dc.subjectTwo-Sided Marketen_GB
dc.subjectVertical Differentiationen_GB
dc.titlePublic goods and tax competition in a two-sided marketen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2011-07-11T14:08:12Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:50:19Z
dc.identifier.issn1097-3923en_GB
dc.descriptionDraft version issued as a working paper; version dated September 8, 2008. Final version available online on http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.eissn1467-9779en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Public Economic Theoryen_GB


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record