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dc.contributor.authorMason, Robinen_GB
dc.contributor.authorValimaki, Juusoen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-01-29T16:23:54Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:58:25Z
dc.date.issued2011en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe propose a simple model of optimal stopping where the economic environment changes as a result of learning. A primary application of our framework is an optimal sales problem when the demand for a seller's good is initially uncertain. We distinguish between two versions of the model. In the first version, a lower price is always more informative; in the second, an intermediate price conveys most information to the seller. For the first model, we show that learning leads to a higher posted price by the seller. In the second version, we give sufficient conditions so that learning leads to a higher posted price for an optimistic seller and a lower price for a pessimistic seller.en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jet.2011.03.013,en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/4241en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://sites.google.com/site/masonrobin/en_GB
dc.subjectLearningen_GB
dc.subjectSmooth stoppingen_GB
dc.titleLearning about the arrival of salesen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-01-29T16:23:54Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:58:25Z
dc.identifier.issn0022-0531en_GB
dc.descriptionAuthor's working paper dated 9 July 2010. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.journalJournal of Economic Theoryen_GB


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