Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample

dc.contributor.author	Vailakis, Yiannis	en_GB
dc.contributor.author	Martins-da-Rocha, V. Filipe	en_GB
dc.date.accessioned	2013-02-13T16:02:22Z	en_GB
dc.date.accessioned	2013-03-19T15:54:30Z
dc.date.issued	2011-10-28	en_GB
dc.description.abstract	Pascoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples to show that in the presence of utility penalties for default, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes and equilibria may fail to exist. We provide a counterexample to their claim by showing that no trade is a competitive equilibrium in the examples they consider.	en_GB
dc.identifier.citation	Volume 75 (1), pp. 277–282	en_GB
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.004	en_GB
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4297	en_GB
dc.language.iso	en	en_GB
dc.publisher	Elsevier	en_GB
dc.subject	Infinite horizon economies	en_GB
dc.subject	Default penalties	en_GB
dc.subject	Collateral	en_GB
dc.subject	Ponzi schemes	en_GB
dc.subject	Pessimistic expectations	en_GB
dc.subject	No-trade	en_GB
dc.title	Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexample	en_GB
dc.type	Article	en_GB
dc.date.available	2013-02-13T16:02:22Z	en_GB
dc.date.available	2013-03-19T15:54:30Z
dc.identifier.issn	0899-8256	en_GB
dc.description	Preprint dated October 12, 2011. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/	en_GB
dc.identifier.journal	Games and Economic Behaviour	en_GB