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dc.contributor.authorVailakis, Yiannisen_GB
dc.contributor.authorMartins-da-Rocha, V. Filipeen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-13T16:02:22Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:54:30Z
dc.date.issued2012-05en_GB
dc.description.abstractPascoa and Seghir (2009) presented two examples to show that in the presence of utility penalties for default, collateral requirements do not always eliminate the occurrence of Ponzi schemes and equilibria may fail to exist. We provide a counterexample to their claim by showing that no trade is a competitive equilibrium in the examples they consider.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationVolume 75, Issue 1, May 2012, Pages 277–282en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.geb.2011.10.004en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/4297en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherElsevieren_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economic-behavioren_GB
dc.subjectInfinite horizon economiesen_GB
dc.subjectDefault penaltiesen_GB
dc.subjectCollateralen_GB
dc.subjectPonzi schemesen_GB
dc.subjectPessimistic expectationsen_GB
dc.subjectNo-tradeen_GB
dc.titleHarsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes: a counterexampleen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-02-13T16:02:22Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:54:30Z
dc.identifier.issn0899-8256en_GB
dc.descriptionPreprint dated October 12, 2011. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.journalGames and Economic Behaviouren_GB


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