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dc.contributor.authorBalkenborg, Dieteren_GB
dc.contributor.authorHofbauer, Josefen_GB
dc.contributor.authorKuzmics, Christophen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-02-18T14:59:15Zen_GB
dc.date.accessioned2013-03-19T15:58:13Z
dc.date.issued2012-02en_GB
dc.description.abstractWe call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (1) has a product structure, (2) is upper hemi{continuous, (3) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and (4) is convex- and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspondence, we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically stable face (MASF) if it is asymptotically stable under some such dynamics and no subface of it is asymptotically stable under any such dynamics. The set of such correspondences (and dynamics) is endowed with the partial order of point-wise set inclusion and, under a mild condition on the normal form of the game at hand, forms a complete lattice with meets based on point-wise intersections. The refined best reply correspondence is then defined as the smallest element of the set of all generalized best reply correspondences. We find that every persistent retract (Kalai and Samet 1984) contains an MASF. Furthermore, persistent retracts are minimal CURB sets (Basu and Weibull 1991) based on the refined best reply correspondence. Conversely, every MASF must be a prep set (Voorneveld 2004), based again, however, on the refined best reply correspondence.en_GB
dc.identifier.citationTheoretical Economics 8 (2013), 165–192en_GB
dc.identifier.doi10.3982/TE652en_GB
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10036/4317en_GB
dc.language.isoenen_GB
dc.publisherWileyen_GB
dc.relation.urlhttp://econtheory.orgen_GB
dc.subjectEvolutionary game theoryen_GB
dc.subjectbest response dynamicsen_GB
dc.subjectCURB setsen_GB
dc.subjectpersistent retractsen_GB
dc.subjectasymptotic stabilityen_GB
dc.subjectNash equilibrium refinementsen_GB
dc.subjectlearningen_GB
dc.titleRefined best reply correspondence and dynamicsen_GB
dc.typeArticleen_GB
dc.date.available2013-02-18T14:59:15Zen_GB
dc.date.available2013-03-19T15:58:13Z
dc.identifier.issn1555-7561en_GB
dc.descriptionPre-print draft dated July 2011 deposited in SSRN archive. Final version published by Wiley; available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/en_GB
dc.identifier.journalTheoretical Economicsen_GB


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