dc.contributor.author | Damjanovic, Tatiana | en_GB |
dc.contributor.author | Ulph, David | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-02-18T15:44:05Z | en_GB |
dc.date.accessioned | 2013-03-19T15:58:00Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2010 | en_GB |
dc.description.abstract | This article examines the determinants of tax non-compliance when we recognise the existence of an imperfectly competitive “tax advice” industry supplying schemes which help taxpayers reduce their tax liability. We apply a traditional industrial organisation framework to model the behaviour of this industry. This tells us that an important factor determining the equilibrium price and hence, the level of non-compliance, is the convexity of the demand schedule. We show that in this context, this convexity is affected by the distribution of pre-tax income, the progressivity of the tax-schedule and the way in which monitoring and penalties vary with income. It is shown that lower pre-tax income inequality as well as a less progressive tax code may cause more tax minimisation activities. Therefore, the frequently advocated policy of reducing the highest tax rate may fail as a policy directed at improving tax discipline. One way of offsetting the possible harm to tax compliance from a less progressive tax could be an adjustment of the penalty and monitoring functions. | en_GB |
dc.identifier.citation | Vol. 54, Issue 4, pp. 594 - 607 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2009.09.003 | en_GB |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10036/4321 | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | en | en_GB |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://eureka.bodleian.ox.ac.uk/3281/ | en_GB |
dc.relation.url | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00142921 | en_GB |
dc.subject | Tax compliance | en_GB |
dc.subject | Tax administration | en_GB |
dc.subject | Inequality | en_GB |
dc.subject | Tax progressivity | en_GB |
dc.subject | Tax monitoring | en_GB |
dc.subject | Penalty function | en_GB |
dc.title | Tax progressivity, income distribution and tax non-compliance | en_GB |
dc.type | Article | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-02-18T15:44:05Z | en_GB |
dc.date.available | 2013-03-19T15:58:00Z | |
dc.identifier.issn | 0014-2921 | en_GB |
dc.description | Pre-print version issued as working paper in 2009 by Oxford University Centre for Business. Final version published by Elsevier; available online at http://www.sciencedirect.com/ | en_GB |
dc.identifier.journal | European Economic Review | en_GB |